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The reasons vs. causes debate reached its peak about 40 years ago. 
Hempel and Dray had debated the nature of historical explanation and 
the broader issue of whether explanations that cite an agent’s reasons are 
causal or not. Melden, Peters, Winch, Kenny and Anscombe had con-
tributed their anticausal conceptions. The neo-Wittgensteinians seemed 
to be winning the day when in 1963 Donald Davidson published his 
seminal paper “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”. Davidson’s paper dev-
astated the Wittgensteinian camp. It contained, among other things, a 
powerful attack on the logical connection argument. Davidson argued 
that the existence of a logical or conceptual connection between descrip-
tions can never eliminate a causal relation, which holds between events 
simpliciter, not between events under certain descriptions. 
Davidson maintained that in a way, reasons can be causes. When 
somebody acts for a certain reason, his intentional attitudes, or rather 
changes in his attitudes, cause his bodily movements. Davidson also ar-
gued that rationalization is a species of causal explanation. For the defi-
nition of action, he argued that intentional actions are bodily movements 
caused in the right way by beliefs and desires that rationalize them. 
Davidson’s paper paved the way for causal theories of action, which su-
perseded neo-Wittgensteinian analyses in the following decades. The 
causal theory was rapidly adopted by Alvin Goldman, David Armstrong, 
Paul Churchland, Myles Brand and many others, entering the main-
stream and dominating the philosophy of action to this very day.  
In 1971 Georg Henrik von Wright published his book Explanation 
and Understanding. The second chapter did not deal with agency, but 
with causation. It developed a new account of causation, the interven-
tionist or experimentalist account. Focusing on causation, von Wright 
remedied a major shortcoming of the reasons vs. causes debate. The 
concept of causality, and the nature of the causal relation, received little 
attention in this debate, a fact that holds true for both camps. Mostly it 
was simply taken for granted that, as Hempel had declared, “causal ex-
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planation is a special type of deductive-nomological explanation”.1 One 
camp then aligned intentional explanations with D-N explanations, 
while the other camp insisted on their disparity. So strictly speaking, the 
label “reasons/causes debate” was a misnomer. The controversy dealt 
primarily with the question as to whether intentional explanations can 
take the form of D-N explanations, while the notion of causation, and 
the metaphysics of the causal relation, were left obscured.  
With von Wright’s new approach, the situation changed. Von 
Wright was primarily concerned with causation, but his approach con-
tained an implicit attack on the causal theory of action as well. His core 
idea was that the notion of causality is intimately linked with, or even 
derived from, the notion of intentionally making something happen. 
Other philosophers, even Hume, had considered such a connection 
before, but often just to reject this view, regarding it as a kind of myth 
belonging to the infancy of the human mind. Von Wright took the idea 
seriously. He submitted the analysis that p is the cause of q if and only if 
by doing p we could bring about q.2 
The causal theory of action was also concerned with the relation 
between causation and agency, to which its name bears witness. The 
causal theory of action holds that actions are bodily movements with a 
certain causal history. This is why von Wright’s account constituted a 
momentous challenge to the causal theory: it reversed the direction of 
conceptual dependency between both notions. Davidson and his follow-
ers tried to define what an intentional action is by using the notion of 
causation. The causal condition which the causal theory sets is part of 
the definition of “doing something intentionally”. Von Wright claimed 
that the conceptual dependency is the other way round. He used the 
notions of doing, and bringing about, to explain what causal relations 
are. So, instead of a causal theory of action, he advocated an agency 
theory of causation, as it may be dubbed. 
It is remarkable how seldom this clash of opinions about conceptual 
primacy is reflected in the literature. There are few exceptions: Fred 
Stoutland noticed the conflict, and he published a number of papers in 
                                           
1  Hempel, C. G.: Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Phil-
osophy of Science, New York/London 1965, p. 300. 
2  von Wright, G. H.: Explanation and Understanding, Ithaca, New York 1971, p. 
70. 
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which he compared Davidson’s and von Wright’s views.3 Von Wright’s 
book Explanation and Understanding was widely read and discussed in 
the seventies, especially in Europe. But it strikes me that especially in 
North America, where the causal theory of action became the orthodoxy 
of the day, von Wright’s challenge went largely unnoticed. Even David-
son did not seem to take it seriously. He nowhere takes notice of the in-
terventionist theory of causation, while he does discuss von Wright’s 
earlier book Norm and Action. As is well-known, Davidson favoured an 
alternative account of causation, based on “the principle of the nomolo-
gical character of causality”, as he somewhat clumsily called it, or, later 
and less clumsily, “the cause-law thesis”.4 Davidson’s firm adherence to 
a nomological theory of causality may explain why he did not take much 
interest in alternative accounts. 
 
 
The Interventionist Account of Causation 
Let me briefly review some features of von Wright’s interventionist 
account. In Explanation and Understanding, von Wright makes the fol-
lowing observation: 
In the idea of putting systems in motion the notions of action and of causa-
tion meet. [...] It is natural to speak of the causes of phenomena as factors 
which ‘produce’ or ‘bring about’ their effects.5 
                                           
3  Stoutland, F.: “The Causal Theory of Action”, in: Juha Manninen and Raimo 
Tuomela (eds.), Essays on Explanation and Understanding. Studies in the 
Foundations of Humanities and Social Sciences, Dordrecht 1976, pp. 271-304. 
Stoutland, F.: “Philosophy of Action: Davidson, von Wright, and the Debate 
over Causation”, in: Fløistad, G. (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy. A New Sur-
vey, The Hague 1982, Vol. 3, pp. 45-72. Stoutland, F.: “Davidson on Intentional 
Behavior”, in: LePore, E. and McLaughlin, B. P. (eds.), Actions and Events. 
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford/New York 1985, 
pp. 44-59. 
4  Davidson, D.: “Mental Events” (1970), in his Essays on Actions and Events, 
Oxford 1980, pp. 207-225. Davidson, D.: “Laws and Cause”, Dialectica 49 
(1995), pp. 263-279. 
5  von Wright, G. H.: Explanation and Understanding, Ithaca, New York 1971, p. 
64. 
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This lead-in lays down one desideratum of an adequate account of cau-
sation, namely, to explain the asymmetry of the causal relation.6 The 
notion of bringing something about is clearly asymmetrical, in a way 
that does not seem to rely simply on the asymmetry of temporal succes-
sion. 
Von Wright’s appeal to the notion of bringing about finds a parallel 
in a remark of John Searle’s. In his book Intentionality, Searle states: 
there are not two kinds of causation, regularity causation and Intentional 
causation. There is just one kind of causation and that is efficient causa-
tion; causation is a matter of some things making other things happen.7 
It is no accident that Searle speaks of “efficient causation”. The notion 
of making something happen has an affinity to Aristotle’s causa effi-
ciens.8 
Now obviously the development, or reconstruction, of a general no-
tion of efficient causation can succeed only if causal efficacy is not con-
fined to human agents. Even if human agents should be the only beings 
who can bring about something intentionally, intentional actions must 
not be the only instances of the cause-effect relation. Von Wright surely 
was tempted to go over to agent causation, but he resisted that tempta-
tion. The agent causality model, as advocated by Chisholm, gives an 
account of the relation between causation and agency that differs both 
from interventionism and the causal theory of action. Chisholm invokes, 
or invents, a second species of causation in addition to event causation, 
namely, agent causation, or, “causality through freedom”, as fellow 
agent causalist Kant called it. This species of the causal relation is sup-
posed to hold literally between agents and events. Adherents to agent 
causation include Richard Taylor, Randolph Clarke, Timothy O’Connor 
and Jonathan Lowe. 
Let me briefly mention what I consider to be the decisive ontologi-
cal objection to agent causation. Using a bit of jargon, agents or persons 
are continuants, i.e. Aristotelian substances that persist in time, while 
                                           
6  Cf. Ibid., p. 42. 
7  Searle, J. R.: Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, 
Mass. 1983, p. 135. 
8  Recently, James Woodward used the phrase “Making Things Happen” as a 
heading for a general theory of causal explanation: Making Things Happen. A 
Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford 2003. 
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actions and events are occurrents, i.e., dated happenings. (This termi-
nology goes back to W. E. Johnson.) Now Charlie Broad raised the fol-
lowing objection against agent causation: 
How could an event possibly be determined to happen at a certain date if 
its total cause contained no factor to which the notion of date has any ap-
plication? And how can the notion of date have any application to anything 
that is not an event?9 
One might object that it is an exaggeration to claim that the notion of 
date “has no application” to persons or Aristotelian substances. The 
problem is rather that these entities, being continuants, simply last or 
live too long. The acting person existed before her action took place, and 
she will live on afterwards. For this reason, she cannot be, in a literal 
sense, the triggering cause of any occurrence. What demands explana-
tion is why this action took place at a certain moment in time, and citing 
the agent as the cause cannot answer that question. Arguably, that ques-
tion cannot be answered without reference to something dated, to a par-
ticular occurrence, e.g., to some mental event inside the person, perhaps 
to a decision of hers or a volition. This is Broad’s datedness objection 
against agent causation. It is a very powerful objection, and as far as I 
can tell is still without a convincing reply. 
Surely there are semantic connections between agent-causal state-
ments and event-causal statements, but it seems impossible for entities 
that persist but do not occur to be causes in a literal sense. Most endors-
ers of agent causality do not take seriously the challenge that lies in 
promoting continuants to causes. Only Kant bit the bullet. He developed 
an account of “timeless agency”, holding that the initiation of a free act 
is not part of the temporal order at all. The transcendental subject, he 
claims, belongs to the noumenal world, while bodily movements belong 
to the empirical world. Virtually no one has found the view credible that 
noumenal selves can cause empirical events in a literal sense. 
Von Wright always steered clear of the difficulties of promoting 
agents to causes. He holds that when an agent makes something happen, 
i.e., when he brings about q by doing p, it is the occurrence of p that 
causes q: 
                                           
9  Broad, C. D.: Ethics and the History of Philosophy, London 1952, p. 215. 
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I am anxious to separate agency from causation. Causal relations exist be-
tween natural events, not between agents and events. When by doing p we 
bring about q, it is the happening of p which causes q to come. And p has 
this effect quite independently of whether it happens as a result of action or 
not.10 
So, far from subscribing to agent causation, von Wright conceives of the 
interventionist account as a superior analysis of ordinary event causa-
tion. 
Now, how does he arrive at his view that p is the cause of q if and 
only if by doing p we could bring about q? Putting the details of his 
view aside, let us recall the vital role that the confirmation of causal 
laws plays in his account. Von Wright starts with a familiar criticism of 
the empiricist regularity analysis: mere regularities might be accidental. 
They do not reflect the alleged necessity of causal connections, and they 
do not support counterfactuals. Causal laws, being nomic truths, would 
support counterfactuals, but where to get them from? 
According to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, the world is “everything that 
is the case”. Now in causal reasoning, we make claims about what 
would have been the case under different conditions, and perhaps even 
about what must be the case. But how do we establish such modal 
claims? How does one, for example, ‘verify’ the counterfactual condi-
tional that if p had not been the case, when in fact it was the case, q 
would not have been the case either? Counterfactual cases cannot be 
observed in nature, after all. Von Wright is well aware of this fact: 
It is logically impossible to verify on any single occasion when p was (is) 
not there, what would have been the case, had p been there.11 
In order to ‘verify’ the counterfactual statement we ought somehow to 
make the actual and the non-actual ‘change place’. How can this be done? 
Literally this can of course not be done at all.12 
Now, fortunately we are not mere bystanders who merely observe what 
actually happens. We have the capacity, as von Wright puts it, 
                                           
10  von Wright, G. H.: Causality and Determinism, New York/London 1974, p. 49. 
11  von Wright, G. H.: Explanation and Understanding, Ithaca, New York 1971, p. 
71. 
12  von Wright, G. H.: “On Causal Knowledge”, in his Truth, Knowledge, and Mo-
dality (= Philosophical Papers III), Oxford 1984, pp. 86-95, p. 92. 
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to interfere with the course of the world, thereby making true something 
which would not otherwise (i.e., had it not been for this interference) come 
to be true of the world at that stage of history.13 
It is important to note that descriptions of ordinary actions already have 
such counterfactual implications. For example, when we say that some-
body opened a window, we imply that the window would have remained 
closed without his interference. Generally speaking: “Productive action 
is the producing of a change on an occasion when no change would 
otherwise have occurred”.14 
According to von Wright, the test procedure for causal counterfactu-
als is this: “doing something and noticing that a certain thing follows; 
refraining from doing and noticing that the same thing does not fol-
low”.15 This procedure, which is, incidentally, reminiscent of Mill’s 
“method of difference”, “is as ‘near’ as we can come to the verification 
of a counterfactual conditional”.16 Von Wright hastens to add that this 
does not mean that causal laws, nomic connections, can be ‘conclusively 
verified’. But it means that their confirmation is not a mere matter of re-
peated lucky observations. [...] One could say that we can be as certain of 
the truth of causal laws as we can be of our abilities to do, and bring about, 
things.17 
Let me stop here to take stock. 
 
– Von Wright rejects the regularity account of causality, for familiar 
reasons. Mere regularities are too weak, because they might be acciden-
tal. 
– So he invokes causal laws, which support counterfactuals. He seems to 
accept what Davidson calls the principle of the nomological character of 
causality. 
                                           
13  von Wright, G. H.: Causality and Determinism, New York/London 1974, p. 39. 
14  von Wright, G. H.: “Replies”, in Juha Manninen and Raimo Tuomela (eds.), 
Essays on Explanation and Understanding. Studies in the Foundations of Hu-
manities and Social Sciences, Dordrecht 1976, pp. 371-413, p. 376. 
15  von Wright, G. H.: Causality and Determinism, New York/London 1974, p. 45. 
16  von Wright, G. H.: Explanation and Understanding, Ithaca, New York 1971, p. 
72. 
17  Ibid., p. 73. 
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– The nomological analysis, however, cannot be the whole story about 
causal relations, since it leaves open the question as to how to confirm 
causal laws. 
– This is where agency comes into play. Our ability to interfere with the 
course of events, and to make the actual and the non-actual ‘change 
place’ hypothetically, enables us to confirm causal laws. 
 
The picture that emerges is this: interventionism does not reject the 
cause-law thesis, rather it fills a gap in the nomological account. Nomic 
truths, it is said, support counterfactuals, but the very notion of a coun-
terfactual condition is indigestible by empiricist analyses. What would 
have been the case is not part of the observable world. Interventionism 
demonstrates where science has to go beyond mere observation, and has 
to take agency and experimentation seriously. 
 
 
Four Objections to Interventionism 
A number of objections to interventionism have been raised. These ob-
jections are mainly directed against von Wright’s analysis that p is the 
cause of q if and only if by doing p we could bring about q. 
(a) The first objection says that the analysis has an air of circularity, 
since the notion of bringing about itself has causal connotations. 
(b) The second objection, which we may dub the sceptical objection, 
says that we simply do not possess a reliable procedure for the verifica-
tion of the counterfactuals in question. It can always happen that our 
certainty as to having brought something about was deceptive, because 
the effect was due to some external cause. This can happen even with 
basic actions, as recent psychological research on the so-called “control 
illusions” has demonstrated. It just does not seem to be the case that 
agents have infallible first-person knowledge of their basic actions, let 
alone of the further effects of those actions. 
(c) The third objection argues that von Wright’s analysis covers only 
general causal statements. This shortcoming is rarely mentioned in the 
literature, so let me explain. It is clear that the interventionist analysis of 
“p causes q” has to be given in generic terms, in order to license causal 
judgements about cases that are beyond our reach. Von Wright clearly 
concedes that non-actions also have causes and effects: “Causation 
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operates throughout the universe – also in spatial and temporal regions 
forever inaccessible to man”.18 So, the interventionist analysis must 
allow for extrapolation to such cases. But von Wright underrates the 
price one has to pay for the possibility of extrapolation. The price is 
simply that the truth conditions for singular causal statements are not 
provided by interventionism. Being told that an event belongs to the 
kind of event that can or could be brought about by a certain means does 
not tell us what in fact caused the event on any particular occasion. One 
can easily imagine a given case where p was not the cause of an instance 
of q, even if generally, doing p might be an effective means of bringing 
about q. Von Wright’s generic analysis leaves this possibility open. 
Recipes, even good recipes, do not always work. 
In my view, there is a grain of truth in each of these objections, and 
more than just a grain in the third. But in order not to lose sight of my 
original concern, which is to describe the challenge that interventionism 
poses to the causal theory of action, I shall make an attempt to locate 
more precisely the role that agency plays in the notion of causation. For 
that purpose, I shall put the three objections aside and bring up a fourth, 
which is closely related to the third. 
(d) Von Wright holds that “we can be as certain of the truth of 
causal laws as we can be of our abilities to do, and bring about, things”, 
as quoted above. Now my question is this: why not simply cut short the 
detour through causal laws and their confirmation, and turn to counter-
factual claims about causal sequences directly? 
Leaving causal laws aside has at least two advantages. First, it might 
well turn out that no causal laws are available anyway, that is, no 
exceptionless generalizations that cover cause-effect pairs are true. 
Nancy Cartwright’s slogan “the laws of physics lie” is certainly an ex-
aggeration, because her arguments apply only to laws of a certain kind. 
Many laws of physics describe relations between universals, and such 
laws cannot have counterinstances, strictly speaking, because they make 
no claims about instances in the first place. Causal laws, however, do 
describe the temporal behaviour of physical systems, and such laws can 
be falsified by counter-instances.19 In fact, no one has ever presented a 
                                           
18  Ibid. 
19  The distinction between laws of succession and laws of coexistence goes back 
to Mill (cf. Mill, J. S.: A System of Logic [= Collected Works VII/VIII], Toronto 
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strict causal law of the kind Davidson requires.20 I cannot substantiate 
this bold claim here, but if I could, my conclusion would be thus: the 
good news is that only some laws of physics lie, the bad news is that 
these are precisely those laws which the champions of the cause-law 
thesis invoke, and that they need, namely strict laws of succession that 
cover cause-effect pairs.21 Physical science is doing quite well without 
strict laws of succession. The laws that physicists are rightly proud of 
are different in character. The only ones who are left empty-handed are 
the philosophical champions of the cause-law thesis. 
The second advantage of avoiding the detour through causal laws is 
that the task of providing truth conditions for singular causal statements 
is facilitated. Laws not only support or license counterfactual judgments, 
every singular causal statement does so too. Von Wright is well aware 
of this fact, and accordingly, he sometimes weakens the conceptual link 
between causation, agency and the confirmation of causal laws. Con-
sider the following passage: 
I do not believe in the existence of a ‘causal glue’ over and above the fact 
that, if p causes q, then, if p had been when in fact it was not, q would have 
been too. The ‘causal glue’ is the truth of the counterfactual statement, one 
could perhaps say.22 
In this passage, von Wright plainly subscribes to the counterfactual 
account of causation. According to this view, if an event caused another 
event, the counterfactual dependence between cause and effect holds 
regardless of whether we have or could have brought about the effect, 
and regardless of whether a strict causal law exists that covers the case. 
                                                                                                                      
1974 [1843], Bk. III, Ch. V, § 1). Mill also makes it clear that “unless there had 
been laws of succession in our premises, there could have been no truths of suc-
cession in our conclusions” (ibid.). 
20  “If c and e are related as cause and effect, there exist descriptions of c and e that 
instantiate a strict law.” Davidson, D: “Replies”, in R. Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting 
Davidson, Berlin/New York 1993, pp. 312-3. 
21  For the details, see Keil, G.: “How the Ceteris Paribus Laws of Physics Lie”, 
in: Jan Faye/Uwe Scheffler/Max Urchs (eds.): Nature’s Principles, Berlin/Hei-
delberg/New York (Springer) 2005, pp. 167-200. 
22  von Wright, G. H.: “Replies”, in Juha Manninen and Raimo Tuomela (eds.), 
Essays on Explanation and Understanding. Studies in the Foundations of Hu-
manities and Social Sciences, Dordrecht 1976, pp. 371-413, p. 384. 
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The counterfactual account is weaker than both the interventionist and 
the nomological account. The question that suggests itself is: What do 
we miss if we replace interventionism proper with the simple counter-
factual analysis? 
 
 
The Counterfactual Analysis of Event Causation 
On the counterfactual analysis of event causation, as it was worked out 
by David Lewis, the singular causal statement “c caused e” is true if and 
only if, 
 
– c and e are individual events that both occurred, and 
– if c had not occurred, e would not have occurred either.23 
 
One may feel inclined to add the third condition that c must have pre-
ceded e, but according to Lewis, “backtracking” counterfactuals should 
not be affirmed anyway, so that the temporal condition is redundant. 
Yet there is a further condition needed, a clause that fixes certain 
circumstances under which the counterfactual dependence holds. With-
out such a clause, it becomes difficult to assess the truth-value of the 
counterfactuals in question. Lewis himself invokes a relation of overall 
similarity between possible worlds. To my mind, this move is a charac-
teristic example of explaining the obscure by appeal to the more ob-
scure. But perhaps we can do better. Causal counterfactuals, which deal 
with events that actually occurred, can be supplemented with a ceteris 
paribus clause. In the philosophy of science there is much controversy 
about the exact content of the ceteris paribus clause, but in this case, the 
clause fixes the circumstances that actually pertained when the causing 
event occurred. If, in counterfactual reasoning, we were free to change 
the prehistory of the causing event, the counterfactual in question would 
no longer have a determinate truth value. For reasons I have explained 
                                           
23  “If c and e are two actual events such that e would not have occurred without c, 
then c is the cause of e” (Lewis, D.: “Causation” [1973], in his Philosophical 
Papers, Vol. II, New York/Oxford 1986, pp. 159-213, p. 167). I neglect Lewis’ 
distinction between causation and causal dependence, because I do not share the 
sole motivation for this distinction: his assumption that the causal relation is 
transitive. 
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elsewhere, the ceteris paribus (hereafter cp) clause needed must have an 
indexical content, so that the hedged counterfactual reads: “If c had not 
occurred, and if everything else had been as it was when c actually 
occurred, e would not have occurred”.24 
The indexical nature of this cp clause, incidentally, precludes its 
being used to restore the truth of causal laws in the face of counter-
instances, for laws must not contain singular terms referring to particular 
objects, locations or times. Hence, if cp clauses have an indexical con-
tent, there can be no such things as cp laws. Indexical cp clauses need 
singular propositions as their habitat, so that they cannot be used to de-
fend the cause-law thesis. But they can do something better for the 
theory of causality, as I just pointed out. They are perfectly intelligible if 
combined with singular counterfactuals. 
Another advantage of the counterfactual analysis is that counterfac-
tual dependence may cut across the mental/physical distinction. There 
are many true mixed counterfactuals with physical antecedents and 
mental consequents, and vice versa. Perception provides examples of the 
first sort: “If the alarm clock had not rung, I would not have acquired the 
belief that it was time to get up”. This is a counterfactual with a physical 
antecedent and a mental consequent. In the case of intentional action, 
the counterfactual dependence runs the other way round: “If I had not 
decided to raise my arm, my arm would not have gone up”. Or, if you 
prefer the belief/desire version, as Davidson does: “Had the agent not 
desired that p and believed that q, the action would not have occurred”. 
Note that no special reference to mental causation is made here. Of 
course, the antecedent of such conditionals describes something mental, 
but this does not mean that there is a special kind of mental causation. 
This fits well with Searle’s observation: our common sense picture does 
not contain two kinds of causation. Causation is a matter of things 
making other things happen, regardless of whether there are mental 
events in the causal chain – or events that can have a mental description, 
as Davidson would put it.25 So, the counterfactual account leaves room 
                                           
24  See Keil, G.: “How the Ceteris Paribus Laws of Physics Lie”, in Jan Faye/Uwe 
Scheffler/Max Urchs (eds.): Nature’s Principles, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 
(Springer) 2005, pp. 167-200. 
25  Von Wright, in his later years, does not even commit himself to the existence of 
mental causation: “[H]is intention (volition) in doing this does not cause the 
bodily movements in which his actions may be said to ‘consist’. These move-
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for mental causation without making a fuss about it. And that is a good 
thing. 
A further advantage of the counterfactual account is that it repre-
sents our epistemic situation better than the regularity theory or the 
nomological theory. As Searle puts it: 
I am much more confident of the truth of my original causal statement and 
the corresponding causal counterfactual than I am about the existence of 
any universal regularities that would cover the case.26 
In sum, I submit the view that the detour through causal laws is an aber-
ration, because the counterfactual analysis already yields the correct 
truth conditions for singular causal statements. I am fully aware that 
substantiating this claim would require a far more rigorous analysis than 
space permits in this paper. Among other things, one would have to go 
into a discussion of alleged counterexamples to the counterfactual analy-
sis, specifically, cases of pre-emption and overdetermination. 
Some philosophers argue that counterfactual dependencies must be 
grounded in something factual, since they are not ground-floor proper-
ties of the physical world. Well, they are grounded. The truth conditions 
for singular causal statements are not given solely by the counterfactual 
analysis. They include the physical properties of the substances in-
volved. For example, claiming that the litmus tincture would not have 
turned red, had the acid not been poured into the test-tube, will fail to 
enlighten anyone who has witnessed the experiment. In science, we sel-
dom ask for the triggering cause and leave it at that. Often the causing 
event is obvious enough, and we rather want to know why the effect 
produced was F, rather than G. In order to answer that question, we will 
have to mention the physical properties of the substances involved, fur-
ther facts about their arrangement and the physical forces present. These 
properties and facts are what ground the counterfactual judgement. 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
ments were caused by nervous processes.” (von Wright, G. H.: In the Shadow of 
Descartes. Essays in the Philosophy of Mind, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1998, 
p. 109). 
26  Searle, J. R.: Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, 
Mass. 1983, p. 118. 
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The Role of Free Agency 
I promised above to make an attempt to locate more precisely the role 
that agency plays in the notion of causation. But now it seems that I 
have parted company with the interventionist analysis altogether, and 
that, in giving preference to the counterfactual account, nothing of von 
Wright’s insights is preserved. 
What exactly do these insights consist of? I have argued against 
making a detour through the confirmation of causal laws, but I have not 
yet addressed the deeper issue as to how we are capable of counterfac-
tual reasoning in the first place. Von Wright correctly stresses that 
counterfactual dependencies cannot be observed in nature. The question 
emerges as to how we come to have beliefs about what would have been 
the case? 
Imagine that Laplacean determinism were true. In a deterministic 
world any given series of events is governed by strict laws of succes-
sion, so that nothing could ever have been other than it actually was. 
There are no open possibilities whatsoever. What about applying coun-
terfactual reasoning about an alternative series of events in such a 
world? To be sure, with counterfactual reasoning we do not commit our-
selves to the claim that the past could have been different. We just say 
that if the past had been different, this difference would have propa-
gated. But if universal determinism is true, the past could not have been 
different. That is, any divergence from actuality that we think up imme-
diately calls for being antedated. Our world cannot have been different 
only at that point in time, the course of events must have diverged 
before. David Lewis describes is thus: 
Had I raised my hand [when in fact I have not], [t]he course of events 
would have diverged from the actual course of events a little while before I 
raised my hand, and at the point of divergence there would have been a 
law-breaking event – a divergence miracle, as I have called it.27 
Now if determinism is true, this pushing back in time of a divergence 
from actuality calls for iteration. It seems that if the world is determinis-
tic, then “if a certain pebble had rolled at a moment when in fact it did 
                                           
27  Lewis, D.: “Are We Free to Break the Laws?” (1981), in his Philosophical Pa-
pers, Vol. II, New York/Oxford 1986, pp. 291-298, p. 294. 
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not roll, the entire previous history of the world would have had to be 
different”.28 Alternatively, agents would have to be able to render the 
laws of nature false. This second alternative, though, seems even less 
attractive. Under determinism, our actions could only be up to us if we 
had the miraculous ability to change either the laws of nature or the past 
– this is the core of the “Consequence Argument” for the incompatibility 
of free will and determinism.29 
Now if any divergence from actuality calls for being pushed back in 
time, we may well ask what the point of the demand is that the diver-
gence miracle be predated at all. In the mouth of the determinist, the 
plea for predating the divergence is simply not sincere, his real convic-
tion being that the divergence from actuality could not have taken place 
at all, not a minute ago, not yesterday, and not at the time of the Big 
Bang. It would have taken a miracle to make the divergence possible, 
but surely determinism does not admit miracles. 
But if this is how matters lie, then counterfactual reasoning about 
what would have been the case under different conditions tends to lose 
its point. If we believed in Laplacean determinism, counterfactual judge-
ments about alternative histories would be futile. We could not explain 
why we assign truth values to some of these judgements. If the “least 
overall departure from reality” that we have to consider, according to 
Lewis, always and indiscriminately requires a world that is different 
from ours in its entire history, then the whole possible worlds semantics 
could hardly be justified. Under determinism, it makes no sense to cal-
culate a “least” overall departure from. I find no solution to this problem 
in Lewis’ work. Therefore I take the demand, inflicted by determinism, 
to reschedule any divergence from actuality back to the Big Bang, or 
perhaps beyond, to be a reductio ad absurdum of counterfactual reason-
ing about alternative histories. A fortiori, then, counterfactual judge-
ments could not be used to analyse or elucidate causal judgements. Last 
but not least, it would be hard to explain how we could have acquired 
the ability for counterfactual reasoning in the first place. 
But we do make causal judgments, and we do reason counterfac-
tually about the past. We judge that if the driver had not overlooked the 
                                           
28  Bennett, J.: “Counterfactuals and Temporal Direction”, Philosophical Review 
93 (1984), pp. 57-91, p. 68. 
29  See van Inwagen, P.: An Essay on Free Will, Oxford 1983, p. 16 and 56. 
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other car, the crash would not have occurred. We even imprison people 
as a result of such reasoning. And when it comes to intentional action, 
we not only reason hypothetically that if the past had been different, 
such-and-such would have been the case, we actually affirm categori-
cally that we could have done otherwise, good libertarians that we are in 
real life. In what Strawson calls our descriptive metaphysics, free ac-
tions are the paradigmatic divergence miracles that need not be pre-
dated. And we need such paradigmatic cases in order to make sense of 
counterfactual reasoning about the past. 
So the picture I am trying to sketch is this: the counterfactual ac-
count gives the correct truth conditions for singular causal statements. It 
need not be relativized to human interventions, or to potential human 
interventions. Our belief in the truth of the counterfactual does not de-
pend on whether we were, or could have been, involved as agents. Von 
Wright’s analysis of “p causes q” is beyond remedy. 
The counterfactual account yields truth conditions for causal state-
ments, but it cannot by itself explain why counterfactual claims have 
truth values in the first place, nor why we are capable of counterfactual 
reasoning. This is where free agency comes into play. Causation is not 
directly linked with agency, but in a more roundabout way. And it is not 
linked conceptually with agency as such, but with libertarian freedom, 
with our ability to do otherwise in given circumstances. 
Of course, none of this amounts to a proof of freedom. Kant is to be 
praised for his insight that no direct proof of freedom is possible, and 
that all we can do is check whether anything stands in the way of free-
dom, i.e., whether there is any reason for not taking the commitments of 
our ordinary conception of agents as choosing their actions seriously. 
Kant maintained that rational beings can only act “under the idea of 
freedom”. Nonetheless, he thought of the empirical realm as being gov-
erned by deterministic laws. In order to resolve this tension, he took 
recourse in transcendental idealism. Though we have the “power of 
spontaneously beginning a series of […] states”,30 we cannot exercise 
this causal power in the world of appearances. This twist is beyond me, 
for human actions take place precisely in the world of appearances. 
Those of us who do not find transcendental idealism credible will crave 
some elbow room in the empirical realm. If it is supposed to be literally 
                                           
30  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 476. 
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true that we are able to act thus or otherwise in given circumstances, 
then the world must contain open possibilities. 
None of this amounts to a proof of the existence of alternative possi-
bilities. It is up to physics or to metaphysics to find out whether our 
world contains open possibilities. But if we look at human agency from 
the inside, as it were, then we are not concerned with the ratio essendi of 
freedom, i.e., with the question as to whether or not the way of the world 
can ever bifurcate, but with its ratio cognoscendi. In performing an 
action, “under the idea of freedom”, as Kant puts it, believing that our 
arm would not have gone up had we not decided to raise it, we become 
aware of a range of alternative possibilities. We do not create these pos-
sibilities, however. They are real enough, but we would not be in a posi-
tion to “see” these possibilities were we mere observers of regularities 
or irregularities. The picture that emerges is that our experience of 
choosing our actions is the ratio cognoscendi for the real possibility of 
alternative courses that the world can take.31 
If we take our pre-philosophical commitment to libertarian freedom 
seriously, thinking differently about our abilities and opportunities is not 
an option for us. It seems to be a built-in feature of our common sense 
conception of agency that the world leaves room for our choices. In this 
respect, my result is still von Wrightean in spirit, since he assumes a 
conceptual link between agency and freedom: 
[T]he concept of an action, the ascriptions of actions to an agent, belong to 
discourse in which ‘free will’ is taken for granted. [...] The ‘freedom’ or 
‘free will’ of a man consists in the fact that he acts, one could say. [...] The 
‘mystery’ of freedom, if there is one, is the ‘mystery’ of the fact that there 
are agents and actions.32 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
31  This sketch is developed in more detail in Keil, G.: Handeln und Verursachen, 
Frankfurt am Main 2000, especially pp. 388-95 and pp. 444-57. 
32  von Wright, G. H.: “Freedom and Determination”, Acta Philosophica Fennica 
31 (1980), pp. 5-88, p. 78-9. 
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Causality in the Human Sciences 
I wish to conclude with some remarks about the role of the notion of 
causality both in our common sense world view and in the scientific 
picture. 
Both von Wright and Davidson had a feeling for the crucial function 
played by the notion of causality in our world-view. In Davidson’s 
much-cited words: 
The concept of cause is what holds together our picture of the universe, a 
picture that would otherwise disintegrate into a diptych of the mental and 
the physical.33 
In order to appreciate this insight, one just has to think of the many 
mixed causal counterfactuals that we affirm. Common parlance does not 
care for the difference between mental and physical causes in such judg-
ments. 
Now contrary to the anti-causalist view in the reasons vs. causes 
debate, causation is not only central to our scientific world view, it is 
essential also to the understanding of intentional action, perception, 
memory and a host of other intentional phenomena. In the decades that 
followed the reasons vs. causes debate, many causal theories of inten-
tional phenomena were developed.34 As causal relations are essential to 
the holding of intentional relations between mind and world, the philos-
ophy of mind and action is not well advised to surrender the notion of 
cause to the naturalistic camp. This is an insight shared by both David-
son and von Wright. 
Davidson has gone one step further. His official doctrine – the 
cause-law thesis – is that wherever there is a singular causal relation, 
there is a strict law that covers the case, whether we know that law or 
not. For the purposes of his “anomalous monism”, it suffices to know 
that such causal laws exist, whereas it is up to physical science to spell 
out those laws. But there is a strong counter current in Davidson’s think-
ing about causality. In his later years, Davidson noticed a tension be-
tween the scientific search for detailed and accurate laws on the one 
                                           
33  Davidson, D.: Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980, p. xi. 
34  For an overview, see Davis, S. (ed.): Causal Theories of Mind: Action, Knowl-
edge, Memory, Perception, and Reference, Berlin/New York 1983. 
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hand, and the use of causal notions on the other. Bertrand Russell had 
referenced that tension before, in his famous paper “On the Notion of 
Cause”. Just like Russell, Davidson says: “[I]t is a sign of progress in a 
science that it rids itself of causal concepts”.35 And again: “Unavoidable 
mention of causality is a cloak for ignorance; we must appeal to the 
notion of cause when we lack detailed and accurate laws”.36 
Now, this insight into the prescientific character of the causal idiom 
gives rise to an exciting new perspective on the reasons vs. causes 
debate. I am thinking of the following remark of Davidson’s, where he 
pleads for a reversal of the received wisdom: 
It is often thought that scientific explanations are causal, while explana-
tions of actions and mental affairs are not. I think almost exactly the re-
verse is the case: ordinary explanations of action, perception, memory, and 
reasoning, as well as the attribution of thoughts, intentions, and desires, are 
riddled with causal concepts; whereas it is a sign of progress in a science 
that it rids itself of causal concepts.37 
So, according to Davidson, the notion of cause, which becomes extinct 
in advanced physics, finds an asylum in a sphere where the Wittgen-
steinians deemed it particularly out of place: in the explanation of action 
and mental affairs. Davidson does not allow, however, that reversed per-
spective to have repercussions for his theory of causality. He sticks to 
the cause-law thesis, and he is not prepared to draw Russell’s moral, 
which can be encapsulated in the slogan “the more nomic, the less 
causal”. Davidson still calls the strict laws that he thinks make causal 
concepts superfluous, “causal laws”. This looks to be an unstable posi-
tion.38 The truth conditions for singular causal statements, i.e., the exis-
tence of strict laws, are such that they, if fulfilled, make the phenom-
                                           
35  Davidson, D.: “Representation and Interpretation”, in Said, K. A. M., Newton-
Smith, W. H., Viale, R. and Wilkes, K. V. (eds.), Modelling the Mind, Oxford 
1990, pp. 13-26, p. 23. 
36  Davidson, D.: Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980, p. 80. 
37  Davidson, D.: “Representation and Interpretation”, in Said/Newton-Smith/ 
Viale/Wilkes (eds.), Modelling the Mind, Oxford 1990, pp. 13-26, p. 22-3. 
38  For a diagnosis of the tension in Davidson’s view, see Bieri, P.: “Mental Con-
cepts: Causal because Anomalous”, in Stoecker, R. (ed.): Reflecting Davidson. 
Donald Davidson Responding to an International Forum of Philosophers, Ber-
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enon disappear. The literal truth of causal talk, according to this view, is 
preserved only by a veil of ignorance. Davidson would retort that 
knowledge of strict laws would only make causal concepts superfluous, 
not causal relations, which hold in nature between mind-independent 
events. Unfortunately, he is silent about the question of what causal 
relations essentially are. His repeated assertion that they are extensional 
relations applies only to singular causal statements, not to the relations 
themselves. 
The tension in Davidson’s position can be resolved if we take into 
account a fact that Russell pointed to, and which Davidson, curiously 
enough, overlooked; namely, that the strict and precise laws that physi-
cists are rightly proud of, have no causal interpretation, because they are 
not even laws of succession.39 
Still, Davidson is to be praised for having corrected the misconcep-
tion that causality is essentially a scientific notion. The application of 
causal concepts is not at all confined to scientific purposes. Nor is it up 
to any scientific theory to determine the “nature” of the causal relation, 
or the truth conditions for causal statements. These are philosophical 
tasks par excellence. In carrying out these tasks, von Wright has made 
further progress than Davidson. Though von Wright’s interventionist 
analysis of “p caused q” is too narrow, he made it clear that causal 
judgments turn on our ability to engage in counterfactual reasoning, and 
that in devising and assessing counterfactuals, we must go beyond the 
attitude of the bystander who merely observes what actually happens. 
                                           
39  See Keil, G.: “How the Ceteris Paribus Laws of Physics Lie”, in Jan Faye/Uwe 
Scheffler/Max Urchs (eds.): Nature’s Principles, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 
(Springer) 2005, pp. 167-200. 
